The Supreme Court vs. the Constitution (Discussion)

At the end of my last post entitled "The Supreme Court vs. the Constitution" I stated: “Comments on the above are welcome and will be responded to, but will not be published or posted. However, the discussion that followed has been so interesting and informative that I do want to share it with you.

So here goes...

Robert Malchman, Esq. of Brooklyn, NY was brief in his remarks. He wrote:

I believe you have the better of the argument, and the errors are quite stunning.  Even in his rebuttal, Mr. Walpin gets Griswold flat wrong.  That case had nothing to do with people being secure in their homes; it was an appeal of petitioners' criminal convictions for selling birth control devices.  Searches and homes, and the Fourth Amendment were irrelevant.  The Court instead found a right to marital privacy, which included the purchase of contraceptives.

As is my wont, I was not equally brief. My response is below:

Yes, I was surprised that he had such a poor defense. It wasn’t just Griswold, The case he cited to support his Declaration of Independence argument, as you can see from the quote, says just the opposite. And how anybody can talk about religion in the public square and totally ignore the 1st amendment is beyond me.

I was surprised because Walpin has always been rather brilliant. At CCNY where we went to school together he was President of the Student Council and I think an editor on one of the newspapers. He took on the President of the college and made him back down. He then went to Yale where he became Editor in Chief of the Law Review. He clerked for two federal judges and then joined the US Attorney’s office, where he was in charge of the prosecution of Roy Cohen, Sen. McCarthy’s sidekick.  He then joined the Rosenman firm where he soon made partner and became the head of its 65 person litigation department. After Walpin retired Bush II appointed him as Inspector General of the Corporation for National and Community Service See here. Obama fired him.

Regardless of the virtue of his Tea Party positions, I would have expected his book to be on more solid ground and his debate with me to be more lucid. Surely his briefs in his law practice must have been argued with much greater skill.

I also noted that he resorted to an attack on his critic rather than relying on the merits of the argument, saying:

"I thank Mr. Scheller for his candor in conceding that, before he read my book, he had already decided that he would not agree with its conclusions. While I will not spend my time responding to each nit-pick that those who read my book (with a closed mind) claim to find…”

The other comment came from Leonard Levenson, Esq. of Manhattan, NY. He wrote:

I have read your review of Walpin's book, his rebuttal and your sur-rebuttal.  Without going into specifics, it seems clear that Supreme Court decisions turn a blind eye to the doctrine of Stare Decisis.  The court does so for 2 reasons:  First, it is an institution respected and admired by the vast majority of the people.  I believe the court receives a favorable rating of 78% of the country; a  remarkable percentage in these days of political division and the obvious politicizing of the Court.  Compare this with the favorable rating of 18% for congress and 44% for the presidency. Because of this respect and prestige they are able to make an imprint upon our life based primarily on the Social and Economic views of the justices. 

 
Secondly, Stare Decisis has limited importance where the Court under discussion is the court of last resort. I suspect that the Court from its inception was a political institution.  It increased its political nature as its prestige increased.   

      

The Supreme Court in the 1930's, in combating Roosevelt and the New Deal measures was acting from a social, economic and political point of view; certainly not from a judicial.  The court members were mostly appointed by the Harding, Coolidge Hoover presidencies and were largely chosen from the empowered elements of our society.  They mirrored the thinking of the 20's just as the Warren Court mirrored the thinking of the 60's (despite the fact that Warren was a Republican and voted to intern the Japanese during WWII). 

     
For the reasons stated, it seems that Walpin's message misses the point, completely.  Simply stated, I believe each Supreme Court justice interprets the constitution more with an eye to his social philosophy and political tone of the times that by a strict adherence to the intention of the founders or the idea of Stare Decisis. 

          

As an aside I did not research the appointment history of the Supreme Court justices of the 30's.  Knowing you excellent reasoning ability, your thoroughness in research and enjoyment of the intellectual battle, I tremble when I cite facts to prove a point to you.

Prompting my very lengthy annotated reply:

You are correct about my " thoroughness in research” because I believe in facts first and then opinions, as opposed to the current trend toward opinions first, and we will invent facts to suit the opinions, which was very much in evidence in Walpin’s very poor defense of his views.

So let me begin by correcting your comment, "First, it is an institution respected and admired by the vast majority of the people.  I believe the court receives a favorable rating of 78% of the country;”

In fact the Court like the rest of our governmental institutions is held in low esteem. Your “facts” are very much out of date. 

Allow me to quote from the Rasmussen Reports as of September 26, 2013: 

"Just 26% of all voters think the Supreme Court is doing a good or excellent job, down from 28% in June. Just as many (26%) rate the Supreme Court poorly, but that's down, too, from June’s all-time high of 30%”. See here.

I think that was a major factor in Justice Roberts deciding to break with his Right Wing colleagues, and uphold Obamacare on the basis of a valid tax, though not on the Commerce Clause, by which, I believe, he hoped to keep his agenda of striking down liberal laws by restricting the Commerce Clause, while improving the standing of the court. It didn’t work. The Court’s reputation continued to decline, as it infuriated the Right, while doing nothing for the views of the Middle or the Left.

The Court, I believe, was in very high esteem after the Nixon fiasco, where the country felt the court had saved our Constitutional system.

Now let me address your next comment, namely, "The Supreme Court (members) in the 1930’s ... " were mostly appointed by the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover Presidencies and were largely chosen from the empowered elements of our society. 

This is correct! That court consisted of Charles E. Hughes, Owen J. Roberts, Benjamin N. Cardoza appointed by Hoover, Willis Van Devanter appointed by Taft, George Sutherland and Pierce Butler appointed by Harding, James C. McReynolds appointed by McKinley, Harlan Fisk Stone appointed by Coolidge, and Louis D. Brandeis, appointed  by Wilson.

Thus only one Justice, Louis D. Brandeis was appointed by a Democrat, Wilson. But that should come as no surprise to anyone, since Republicans held the Presidency for 12 years, similarly to the 12 years of Republican rule in the White House during the Reagan/ Bush years and the 20 out of 28 years if you count the Reagan to Obama years, where we had Republicans in the White House continuously, with the break of Clinton for 8 years.

I assume that in raising the question of who appointed  the Supreme Court Justices you assume that this is a predictor of how they will vote. But that has not been true through most of our history, and is a relatively recent phenomenon.  As I point out above 8 of the 9 Justices were appointed by Republicans, which one might assume would mean that the votes striking down New Deal legislation would be 8 to 1, but that was not the case.

Most decisions were five-to-four with only four Justices consistently voting to strike down New Deal legislation, and the fifth vote coming from various other members. See here. Also here and here.

Just when appointments became predictors of how a Justice would vote is something I have not researched, but I suspect it started with Nixon’s southern strategy when he made two nominations of outspoken racist Southerners G. Harrold Carswell and Clement Haynsworth for the vacancy, but the Senate rejected them. I suspect that from that time on, Presidents made nomination not on the basis of qualifications, but on carefully vetted political and judicial philosophies. 

You say: Stare Decisis has limited importance where the Court under discussion is the court of last resort. This is an important point and I think that what this whole discussion leads to a conclusion that Walpin, you and I might be able to agree on. The Court is too powerful!

But that has long been a view and various proposals to reduce the Court’s power have been proposed. After the Court struck down the New Deal legislation, "Public anti judicial sentiment intensified; many critics questioned the constitutionality of the concept of judicial review itself. As a result of this reaction, several constitutional amendments were introduced into Congress in 1936, including one that would require a two-thirds vote of the Court whenever an act of Congress was declared unconstitutional; another that would permit Congress to revalidate federal laws previously declared unconstitutional by repassing them with a two-thirds vote of both houses, and even one that would abolish altogether the Court's power to declare federal laws unconstitutional." But they went nowhere.

However, Roosevelt’s court packing plan, which was denounced by many even in his own party, seemed to have the desired effect, causing one of the Justices to change his votes to validate New Deal legislation, resulting in the famous slogan: “The switch in time that saved nine”. See here.

But with life expectancy short Roosevelt was able to replace all nine Justices with his own choices by 1941. See here.

We talk about equal branches of government. But to quote George Orwell "Some are more equal than others.” Congress is balanced off by having two branches and subject to a veto by the President and by the Supreme Court. The President can be checked by Congress’ refusal to pass the legislation he desires and by the Supreme Court, but the Court can only be over-ruled by an amendment to the Constitution that needs 2/3 of both Houses and 3/4 of state legislatures, an almost impossible task, and the power of the Court has been enhanced by the longevity of life expectancy and the tendency of Presidents to choose Justices who are young, thus extending their philosophy long after another President or Presidents take office. It is unlikely that Obama will be able to change the philosophical nature of the court, since the only Justice likely to retire (or die) during Obama’s remaining years is Justice Ginsburg, whose replacement by Obama will not change the balance.

But you fall into the Walpin trap when you talk about "strict adherence to the intention of the founders”. That, of course is the concept of “Originalism”, which I denounce in my response to Walpin. For many reason, including the one set out in the Preface of the book co-authored by Robert Bork entitled LOCATING THE BOUNDARIES: THE SCOPE OF CONGRESS'S POWER TO REGULATECOMMERCE to which I refer in my post, that is a concept that has zero merit. Aside from the reasons mentioned in this book, the founders intentions have been radically altered by the 27 amendments to the Constitution, and to go by what their intentions were, is to ignore all these amendments. Let us remember, that the founders intended that slavery be part of our institutions, so that if we go by their intent, we must ignore the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments, and accept the juridical maintenance of slavery.

Furthermore Justice Scalia, along with Thomas and Kennedy, have rejected legislative history as a guide to interpretation. See here at p.182 and what is a reference to a founder’s intent, but the use of legislative history. Legislative history on a document many times amended, is doubly absurd.

But I think you also fall also into the fallacy of equating both progressive interpretation of the Constitution with those who are interested in protecting, to quote from your comment, "the empowered elements of our society”. To understand that we have to look at how the 14th amendment has been abused. This amendment was intended to empower the newly freed slaves. Section 1 provides:

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

So whom did the Supreme Court choose to protect with this amendment in its earliest interpretation. The newly freed men? No! It was "the empowered elements of our society”. The Supreme Court in its first interpretation of the amendment in the The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), chose to protect the rights of the "Butchers' Benevolent Association’ and set in motion the use of the amendment to thwart all social and labor legislation. Was that the intent of the authors of the amendment? Clearly, NO! But that is the  point of all this Originalism. It is insincere and phony and is never used when it doesn’t bring about the right result.

On the other hand to use the language in a manner that is appropriate to a modern understanding of its language, is the only approach that makes any sense. What “cruel and unusual" punishment was in the 18th century clearly is not what it means in the 21^st century.

Finally, Levenson had some concluding observations:

I agree with you that in the past Supreme Court Appointees have often surprised and disappointed the President appointing them.  I suspect that this is true with regard to Earl Warren, Cardoza, Brandeis, Stone and others.  I think you are also right about recent appointees who seem to remain faithful to their economic, political and social philosophies more so than those of the past. 

 What I did find interesting and what surprised me was your comments about efforts to limit the power of the court to declare laws unconstitutional. I was under the impression that Roosevelt's court packing was the only effort to combat the courts powers to declare a law unconstitutional.  On reflection, such ideas have merit. 

 Requiring more than a simple majority of the justices to overturn a law has the virtue of removing political considerations from their decisions except in the rare situation of a court almost totally appointed by Presidents of a single party.  With regard to treating Court decisions as a judicial veto, which could be overridden, I think this would complicate an already overburdened legislative process.  

The Supreme Court vs. the Constitution

An erstwhile friend, Gerald Walpin, Esq., who I introduced to his wife some 50 years ago, but who ended the friendship soon thereafter, has surfaced, publishing a book titled "The Supreme Court vs. The Constitution," which is available on Amazon. 

Out of an interest in the writings of one out of my past, I bought the book, read it, reviewed it, and published my review on Amazon.

This led to an exchange that I want to share with you. It consists of three parts: My review, Mr. Walpin’s rebuttal, and my sur-rebuttal. 

Publishing all three in one post makes this very long, but for whatever it is worth, here it is. (I am no longer writing for my blog, but continue to post that which I write in other contexts.)

My Review

I have to say that I was deeply disappointed by the quality of this book. While I did not expect to agree with its conclusions, I expected its reasoning and its analysis to be beyond compare. My expectations in this regard derived from the authors undoubtedly brilliant career as is set forth in the latter pages of his book and which did not even mention the author having been awarded the American Inns of Court Professionalism Award for the Second Circuit.

Unfortunately, while the book gives great pretense to being a scholarly work, boasting 881 end notes, it falls flat not only for its distortions, but for its glaring omissions, not to speak of its inaccuracies. In the final analysis it ends up being no more than a screed in support of its undoubtedly sincerely held opinions. In summary, the book concludes that every Supreme Court decision that Walpin likes is one that is anchored in the Constitution, while every decision it dislikes is denounced as judicial activism, and even as being anchored in the jurist's “personal views”.

In its very early pages (at pages four and five to be exact) the author criticizes Justice John Roberts for having voted to uphold the individual mandate in the Obamacare statute on the ground that it is a Constitutionally permissible tax and asserts that this was, “an interpretation that no other justice joined."

This is quite a remarkable assertion since a glance at the opinion reveals that Justice Ginsburg, with others joining wrote:

“I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar the Court’s consideration of this case, and that the minimum coverage provision is a proper exercise of Congress’ taxing power.”

But quite aside from taking the Chief Justice to task for not striking down a clearly constitutional act of Congress, Mr. Walpin lauds the five Right Wing Justices for having all agreed that the Act does not stand constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause.

On this subject he chooses not to mention the view expressed by President Ronald Reagan’s Solicitor General, Charles Fried:

“Now, is it within the power of Congress? Well, the power of Congress is to regulate interstate commerce. Is health care commerce among the states? Nobody except maybe Clarence Thomas doubts that. So health care is interstate commerce. Is this a regulation of it? Yes. End of story….” [The full transcript of the interview can be found here.] 

Walpin then goes on to assert that the country’s “foundation documents” are “The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution." Now I do not want to belittle the importance of the Declaration of Independence, which was a resounding assertion of the Colonies right to rebel against the British crown. But it has no legal standing in our jurisprudence. It was written long before there was anything resembling a United States. It was published in 1776. Even the Articles of Confederation were not adopted until 1781 and the Constitution, which is the country’s foundational document, was not adopted until 1787. So why does Walpin make this rather far fetched assertion. We find out when we turn to Chapter IV of Walpin’s book. He asserts in the heading to the Chapter, (no less) “FROM GOD AS THE SOURCE OF ALL RIGHT TO THE BANNING OF GOD."

Now Walpin’s problem here is that God in not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. There is no mention of a deity; there is no mention, of “the laws of nature and of nature’s God”; there is no mention of “Divine Providence.”

The only mention in the Constitution of religion is in the very first amendment of the Bill of Rights, known as the “Establishment Clause” and it states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
 religion, …” That’s it. And Walpin devotes a chapter to discussing God in the Constitution and never mentions this inconvenient clause of the Constitution and then berates the Court when it gives voice to this Constitutional mandate.

I could go on chapter after chapter citing these errors of omission and commission, but that would make this review intolerably long. So let me mention just one other deliberate distortion. In discussing the seminal case of Roe v. Wade, which legalized abortion, Walpin gives the impression that the concept of a Right to Privacy was first enunciated in Roe. In fact it was put forth in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) a case that gave constitutional protection to contraception. Why was this not mentioned? I suggest it was because a right to contraception is not controversial.To a large extent Walpin argues for a theory often ascribed to putative Supreme Court Justice Robert Bork known as “Originalism”, which to a large extent acts as though the Constitution had never been amended, the Civil War had never been fought, and particularly the 14th and 15th amendment had never had been enacted. Yet Justice Bork himself appears to now have repudiated this doctrine.

In a book that he co-authored [It can be found here.] there is set forth in its Introduction: 

“Regrettably, but perhaps inevitably, ‘[t]he ink was not yet dry on the Constitution when its revision began.’ Almost immediately, Congress began pressing beyond specifically enumerated powers granted it in Article I. As a result, today, Americans encounter a national government far more expansive than the Framers and men of their generation could ever have imagined…

“Uncertainty stems, in part, from the recognition that the scope of the commerce power has expanded so far beyond the original understanding of that power's boundaries that any attempt to adhere strictly to its original meaning today would likely be futile and inappropriate… “There is no possibility, today, of adhering completely to the original constitutional design. Such a daring plan would require overturning the New Deal, the Great Society, and almost all of the vast network of federal legislation and regulation put in place in the last two-thirds of the twentieth century. It appears that the American people would be overwhelmingly against such a change and no court would attempt to force it upon them.”

And at a later point he goes on to say: “When the world has changed but the underlying constitutional principle remains, the task for those ‘in this generation [is] to discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew, apply to the world we know.’ The world we know includes the long-standing jurisprudence on the commerce power because ‘[w]hen there is a known principle to be explicated the evolution of a doctrine is inevitable."I wish I could say positive things about a book written by one with such a brilliant career, but alas, I cannot.

Walpin’s Rebuttal:

I thank Mr. Scheller for his candor in conceding that, before he read my book, he had already decided that he would not agree with its conclusions. Significantly, he doesn't even dispute the basic lesson of my book - that a majority of justices have too frequently substituted their personal views for what our Founders intended the Constitution to mean, many times also ruling contrary to earlier Supreme Court precedents.

While I will not spend my time responding to each nit-pick that those who read my book (with a closed mind) claim to find, I will exemplify the basic error in Mr. Scheller's comments by responding to two of his meritless assertions. First, he proclaims that the Declaration Of Independence has "no legal standing in our jurisprudence." That assertion disregards about 200 Supreme Court opinions that cite the Declaration Of Independence. Here is one example, Cotting v. Godard, a 1901 opinion, very telling in its words that directly controvert Mr. Scheller's criticism. First, the Court referred to the Declaration Of Independence as the "first official act of this nation" that "declared" this government's "foundation" - just the word Mr. Scheller chastises me for using. And then the Supreme Court repeated what it had said in an 1886 opinion: "It is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration Of Independence," i.e., the Declaration Of Independence, where relevant, should be considered in deciding the meaning of the Constitution.

Let's also look at the specifics of what Mr. Scheller was arguing when he asserts the current irrelevancy of the Declaration Of Independence. According to him, the Declaration's recognition of God as "the source of all rights" was rejected by the adoption of the Constitution. He fails to explain how the same generation, including eight of the same people who signed the Declaration and were also personally involved in drafting the Constitution, would only 11 years later suddenly discard God from that central place of recognition in our Country. Also, he is forced to ignore, because it cannot be reconciled with his exiling God from our Country, the many examples in my book of our Country's succeeding generations' reaffirmation of the Declaration's recognition of God, in placing "In God We Trust" on our Country's issued money, and choosing it as our Country's motto.

A second Mr. Scheller's meritless attacks on my book: He faults me for "giv[ing] the impression that the concept of a right to privacy was first enunciated in Roe" in 1973. He cites Griswold v. Connecticut, 8 years before Roe, as having given "Constitutional protection to" person's privacy. Mr. Scheller ignores several pages at the beginning of this chapter, where I relate that the Constitution's Bill of Rights created a right to privacy in the specified contexts of those provisions, such as, "the right not to have the privacy of one's home, property, and body violated by any unreasonable search (Fourth Amendment.)" Unlike what Mr. Scheller asserts, the 1965 Griswold case was nothing more than a reaffirmation that the Fourth Amendment protected husbands and wives in their home from an invasion of police to determine if they were using condoms or other birth-control devices. See this language from the Griswold opinion: "The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the `right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses ... against unreasonable searches and seizures," not "allow[ing] the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives." This was a quote from NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307. This was consistent with a 1967 Supreme Court decision - 2 years after Griswold that rejected "a general `right of privacy'." Thus, when Roe suddenly "found" a general right to privacy, it was creating a right that the Court, six years before, had ruled did not exist.
Enough said. Mr. Scheller can continue his nit-picking, to which I will no longer respond. I prefer instead to leave the evaluation of my book to those who read it with an open mind.

My Sur-Rebuttal:

Mr. Walpin thanks me for my candor “in conceding that, before (I) read (his) book, (I) had already decided that (I) would not agree with its conclusions. That should not be a surprise to him since, as he well knows, I am thoroughly familiar with his views, but even if I weren’t, the endorsement of his book by Professor Yoo, the author of the infamous torture memo, would have given more than a clue.

But in an age when most people only read that which they expect to agree with, Mr. Walpin should give me credit for reading that which I had every expectation would be opposite to my deeply held views. Be that as it may, Mr. Walpin should thank me, for nothing propels an interest in a book more than controversy, and I note that since I posted my critique the number of people who posted favorable comments on his book went from one to three.

But allow me to respond to Mr. Walpin’s post.

Mr. Walpin writes in his rebuttal: “Significantly, he doesn't even dispute the basic lesson of my book - that a "majority of justices have too frequently substituted their personal views for what our Founders intended the Constitution to mean, many times also ruling contrary to earlier Supreme Court precedents.”

Indeed I do not dispute that a majority of justices have too frequently substituted their personal views for what the Constitution provides, many times also ruling contrary to earlier Supreme Court precedents!” But Walpin turns the situation on its head. It is the Robert and the Rehnquist courts that have consistently used a bare 5-4 majority to strike down years of precedent and been a far more “activist court” than any in recent memory. Allow me to quote from Professor Winkler’s excellent essay to be found on the SCOTUS blog here.

“Since John Roberts became Chief Justice in 2005, the Court has issued one landmark ruling after another. The Roberts Court gave us Citizens United, which struck down longstanding limits on corporate political spending. This Court also allowed new restrictions on women’s right to choose; became the first Supreme Court in American history to strike down a gun control law as a violation of the Second Amendment; effectively outlawed voluntary efforts by public schools to racially integrate; and curtailed the reach of environmental protections.

“In many of these decisions, the Roberts Court overturned or ignored precedent, including Rehnquist Court decisions less than a decade old. Prior to Citizens United, the Supreme Court had explicitly held in two cases that corporate political expenditures could be limited – the most recent of which was handed down in 2003. Six years before the Roberts Court upheld the federal ban on “partial birth” abortion, the Rehnquist Court, which wasn’t known for its liberal leanings, had overturned a nearly identical law.

“Of course, the Roberts Court isn’t the first to overturn precedents and issue major rulings. Yet this Court has been uniquely willing to do so by sharply divided 5-4 majorities. The Warren Court’s Brown decision was famously 9-0. New York Times v. Sullivan, which freed up the media to discuss public figures, was decided by the same margin. Gideon v. Wainwright, on the constitutional right to counsel, and Loving v. Virginia, invaliding bans on interracial marriage, were also unanimous. Even Roe v. Wade was decided by an overwhelming 7-2 vote.”

And this quote from Professor Winkler does not even touch upon the unprecedented decision in Bush v. Gore where the court took the unprecedented step of choosing the next President of the US by a partisan 5-4 decision, nor the very recent decision in SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. where the court struck down a statute specifically authorized by the 15th Amendment, which provides: 

“SECTION. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to
 vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 

SECTION. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.” 

The power was given to Congress to decide what the appropriate remedy is, not the court’s. Yet SCOTUS by 5-4 decided that Congress used bad judgment, and took it upon itself to declare unconstitutional that which the Constitution expressly authorized Congress to decide.

But let me now return to Mr. Walpin’s attack on me. He refutes my contention that the “Declaration of Independence” is not the law of the land and claims “200 Supreme Court opinions that cite the Declaration Of Independence.” He then goes on to say, “Here is one example, Cotting v. Godard, a 1901 opinion, very telling in its words that directly controvert Mr. Scheller's criticism.”

But its words don’t, and it doesn’t.

Allow me to quote from that decision, “such declaration of principles (referring to the Declaration of Independence) may not have the force of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of right and duty, …” (Emphasis added).

Did Mr. Walpin think I would not bother to read the decision?

But in insisting that the Declaration of Independence somehow overrules the clear mandate of the Constitution, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion”, he insists on pretending that this language does not exist. He then asks me to explain: “How suddenly (the founders would) discard God from that central place of recognition in our Country”. But they didn’t! They simply said, as the Supreme Court has held, that it is not the Government’s place to be involved in religion. It belongs in the private sphere, and that has served this country well.

But then Walpin goes of the rails on the Courts history on “privacy” and goes from distorting to dissembling.

In writing about the Griswold case, Mr. Walpin writes and I quote “Unlike what Mr. Scheller asserts, the 1965 Griswold case was nothing more than a reaffirmation that the Fourth Amendment protected husbands and wives in their home from an invasion of police to determine if they were using condoms or other birth-control devices.”

But that is patently untrue. The defendants in the Griswold case were charged with, and I quote from the Court’s opinion: “(giving) information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free.” 

And the statute that was before the court in the Griswold case provided in Section 54-196: 

“Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.”

Does that sound like it was about police invading anybody’s home?

Mr. Walpin accuses me of “nit-picking”. Does the exposure of such fundamental misstatements amount to “nit-picking”?

There should always be room for differences of opinion. But the misrepresentation and/or distortion of facts is inexcusable. This has become far too frequently the realm of our political discourse. I had hoped for something far better from Mr. Walpin, and I still hope for something better from him in the future.

Comments on the above are welcome and will be responded to, but will not be published or posted.