Your history is largely right on, but I think that you are not entirely fair to the New York Times article and not as nuanced as the real story is. The article does not really say that the founders wanted a weaker government than the Articles of Confederation, but it does, largely correctly, point out that there was fear about one branch of government becoming too powerful, hence the elaborate system of checks and balances. Indeed the writers of the Constitution rejected (unfortunately in my opinion) a parliamentary system in which there is for the most part a single branch. Under that system, which exists in most of Europe, the party that is elected has the power to enact the basic legislation it has promised the voters that it would. The minority cannot block the measures introduced by the majority. (Of course the fly in the ointment occurs when there are three or more parties, making compromises and deals essential.) Had we such a system here when Obama and the Democrats won big majorities in 2008, they could have passed their program without any real problems or much compromise. That is not to argue that the Republicans in the Senate are following constitutional precedent when they, while still in the minority, successfully block appointments and the executive's ability to carry out laws. In the past, the unwritten understanding was that a president could have the appointees he wanted who reflected his point of view, with only occasional exceptions. I cannot remember a time in history when the opposition party was so single-mindedly determined to insure that the President fails and uses the bludgeon of threatened filibuster to block just about everything and everyone.
Which I tried to rebut with:
Thank you for your input. I am glad that I provoked you into commenting.
However, I question that the "elaborate checks and balances" were intended to cause gridlock. First I question whether the "Checks and Balances" that the Times and you both refer to were a concept at the convention. I can find nothing in the Constitutional debates that indicates that it intended the Supreme Court to act as a restraint. As a matter of fact, before Marbury vs. Madison was decided it was assumed by President Washington that the Court had no such power and that the veto power was to be used to reject what the President considered unconstitutional.
So aside from the bicameral legislature which I contend was the result of the compromise outlined by me, the only other check or balance is the President's veto. While my reading in this area, I am sure, is not as extensive as yours, I have found nothing to indicate that the bicameral legislature was intended as a check or a balance. I am sure that you are correct that the founders considered a parliamentary system, which I agree would be better than what we have, but I contend it was rejected, not because it would not be enough of a check on power, but rather because it did not satisfy the two faction at the convention, as I stated. Also there was precedence for it in the British system, which had the House of Commons and the House of Lords (bicameral) with the King being the Chief executive, the President in our system.
I keep hearing the words "checks and balances" but I am not even sure that those words were used at the convention. I believe, though, of course, I may be wrong, that this is a modern invention.
As a matter of fact there was great concern that the Constitution gave the federal government too much power; hence the demand for the Bill of Rights, which I grant you was intended to limit the power of the federal government, but that is different from the contention that the Constitution itself was intended to hamstring the government as a way of making sure it does not overstep.
Can you cite anything that would indicate that the bicameral legislature was intended as a check or a balance, rather than the need for compromise as I have argued.
As for doing an injustice to the Times, even if I was wrong here, and I don't concede that I was, there are many, many instances of the Times feeding into the paradigm of the Right. For example its distorted writing by Judith Miller in support of Iraq war, its slandering of Gore and Kerry and its reluctance to report on Watergate, see e.g: The Media II - Falsehoods about Gore, The Media! (Watergate/Clinton) and The Media III - Falsehoods about Kerry. I could cite many others and may return to that subject at a later time.
After further research I added:
Since dispatching the message below, I tried to search for any mention of checks and balances in the records of the debates at Philadelphia. I could find none.
I then went to the Federalist Papers where I did find a reference to checks, but not to balances in Federalist No. 51 and where Publius writes:
"First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people."
But I don't find that adequate or convincing proof that the bicameral legislature was intended as a "check and balance" even if possibly Hamilton or Madison used something close to such an argument on its behalf.
As you can see I am perfectly willing to prove myself wrong and will happily (well maybe not happily) concede that I was wrong if any evidence, other than that it is the conventional wisdom even among historians, can be adduced by you or me or anyone else. However, I am always suspicious of conventional wisdom, even if held by a distinguished group, absent convincing evidence.
The discussion concluded with Dr. Mayo's following observations which largely quoted further from Federalist No. 51. Her comments are in parentheses and bold.
So I think this discussion is going in circles. Here are the relevant sections of Federalist 51:
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconvenience is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. (Idea of 2 branches as checks on each other.)
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure (this) method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.
(By the way this shows a realization of judicial branch's role) A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.
(The 2 branches of the legislature is not the central point, but it is also clear that one was to represent the people and the other representing the states, as you rightly point out, was also NOT chosen by the people deliberately to provide counter-weight to messy popular "passions.")
Let me conclude with, what has become a somewhat esoteric, though very interesting discussion, by pointing out that Dr. Mayo is unable to quote from the minutes of the convention itself (though of course there were no official minutes, only the recollection of participants at the convention) and neither she nor I can find any reference to this issue in the Federalist Papers except in one out of eighty-five, and this was in an attempt to sell the document, hardly a reliable way to determine the intent of the authors.
But I say the argument is esoteric, because the principal cause of the gridlock, is not the existence of the two Houses, but the use of non-Constutional means to obstruct, most particularly the filibuster and the willingness to cause untold damage to the country, unless its agenda is adopted. In this connection the Times article, whether having a basis or not, feeds into the false paradigm that the problems we have encountered are the results of the structure of our government, rather than the deliberate obstructionism by any and all means of one of our parties.
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